THE "HIGH VALUE TARGETING" (HVT) PROGRAMAS DE ASESINATOS DE LA CIA (WIKILEAKS)

Una de las empíricas característas mas impresionantes que nos han traído los documentos sacados a la luz por WIKILEAKS es la omnipresencia de estos masacradores de esperanzas.

Estan en todas partes apagando cualquier luz que pueda asomar en el horizonte de los pueblos. 

Es altamente significativa, para entender éste momento histórico, ésta sin limites ubicuidad  con acceso directo a neutralizar --con el crimen-- a cualquier grupo militante que atente contra los intereses imperiales.

Ni que decir tiene que trabajan-en-equipo con los gobiernos locales que no son gobiernos de los pueblos que representan sino que pertenecen al Club Internacional de Clases Sociales en el Poder (CICSP) que, amalgamadas en un  solo  Gobierno Global (GG), es el  Gobierno de facto de la dictadura capitalista a escala mundial.  Las llamadas soberanías nacionales son tan solo las tramoyas tras la que se esconde ese GG,  dentro del cual, la omnipresencia de los escuadrones de la muerte del imperio (CIA),  es el  Alma Mater de todo  el asunto.
Veamos como trabaja ésta Alma Mater:

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This is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impact on insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is for
internal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on these
groups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgent
groups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel,
Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, which
is "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obama
administration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States very
significantly increased its CIA assassination program at the expense of capture operations.

It produces a chart for US officials to use in strategically assessing future operations and methods in HVT assassinations.
 

Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel,

Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS, FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassination
Restraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals)
Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-Value
Date:
July 07, 2009

Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society Group
Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-hvt-counterinsurgency.
               
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High-Value Targeting Defined (C//NF)

We define high-value targeting as focused

operations against specific individuals or networks whose removal or marginalization should disproportionately degrade an insurgent group’s effectiveness.

The criteria for designating highvalue
targets will vary according to factors such as
the insurgent group’s capabilities, structure, and

leadership dynamics and the government’s desired

outcome. (C//NF)

Our study of successful and unsuccessful uses of HVT programs in counterinsurgencies identified several best practices that can be apply when planning or evaluating HVT operations:

 

• Identifying Desired Outcome.
Because HVT operations can have unforeseen effects, governments tend to be most successful when they areclear about the desired impact on the insurgent group’s trajectory.

• Basing Decisions on Knowledge of an Insurgent Group’s Internal Workings.
Governments’ successful use of HVT operations generally draw on a deep understanding of the targeted group’s internal workings and specific vulnerabilities, which is usually gained by penetrating the group or debriefing defectors.

 

• Integrating HVT Operations With Other Elements of

Counterinsurgency Strategy.

Governments with effective HVT programs have integrated them into comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies, the other elements of which could be adjusted to capitalize on or compensate for the effects produced by HVT operations.

• Protecting Potential Moderates.

Directing HVT operations against the most violent and extremist leaders may increase the likelihood of an eventual political settlement. Many insurgencies have internal divisions between the more militant leaders and those more politically oriented.

• Capitalizing on Leadership Divisions.

Exacerbating or exploiting

leadership fissures, for example by co-opting disaffected insurgent leaders, can be as effective as targeting a group’s leadership through military action. (C//NF)

                  

Eroding Insurgent Effectiviness

HVT operations can cause greater disruption than a group can absorb when strikes outpace a group’s ability to replace its leaders or when the strikes result in the loss of individuals with critical skills such as

finance and logistics—who comprise a finite

quantity in any insurgency, according to our

review. HVT operations typically force remaining

leaders to increase their security discipline, which

may compromise a leader’s effectiveness.

• In Colombia, successful HVT strikes against

top insurgent leaders in early 2008, in

conjunction with earlier strikes against secondand

third-tier leaders and finance and logistics

specialists, substantially eroded the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s

(FARC) capabilities, according to clandestine, Colombian National Police, and US Embassy in

Bogota reporting.1 2 3

 

 • In Iraq, Jaysh Muhammad (JM) suffered a

significant setback in 2004 after British

forces captured the head of JM and his

replacements in short succession, according to

the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate.5

• Usama bin Ladin’s measures to avoid

detection, including his reliance on lowtechnology

communications, his reluctance to

meet with subordinates, and his contentment

with leading from a sequestered distance via

infrequent contact, have affected his ability to

command his organization, according to detainee

reporting.6 7 8 9 10 11 (S//NF)

Weakening Insurgent Will.

Leadership losses can  erode morale at all levels of the insurgency and reinforce the costs and risks of involvement, especially when no clear succession plan is in place.

Colombia.  The March 2008 death of FARC Secretariat member Raul Reyes is likely to have seriously damaged FARC discipline and morale, even among its leadership, according to a CIA field commentary.12.  Within a week of Reyes’ death,

Secretariat member Ivan Rios was killed by a

bodyguard, and in May 2008 a veteran FARC

commander and ideologue surrendered.13

 

• Rank-and-file morale also suffered when

HAMAS failed in 2004 to announce the name of

its new leader following the deaths of Sheikh

Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, according to

an academic terrorism expert.14 (S//NF)

Changing the Level of Insurgent Support.

The death or capture of key insurgents may lead to

reduced domestic or foreign support for the group,

as supporters recalculate the insurgent group’s

chances of winning the conflict and consider the

potential costs of backing the losing side. Such a

phenomenon is enhanced when leadership strikes

coincide with other counterinsurgency successes.

 

• Malaysia’s arrest in 1998 of four top leaders of

the southern Thai separatist insurgent group

Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO),

in concert with civil-military programs and an

expanded amnesty, led to substantial increases in

separatist defections and a decline in domestic

support for the group, according to reporting

from the US Embassy in Bangkok.15 16 17 (C//NF)

 

HVT strikes, however, may increase support for

the insurgents, particularly if these strikes enhance

insurgent leaders’ lore, if noncombatants are killed

in the attacks, if legitimate or semilegitimate

politicians aligned with the insurgents are targeted,

or if the government is already seen as overly

repressive or violent. Because of the psychological

nature of insurgency, either side’s actions are

less important than how events are perceived by

key audiences inside and outside the country,

according to an academic expert on

counterinsurgency.18

 

• Israeli HVT efforts from 2000 to 2002

strengthened solidarity between terrorist groups

and bolstered popular support for hardline

militant leaders, according to US Embassy

officials in Jerusalem and clandestine

reporting.19 20 21 22 23 (S//NF)

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Esto es tan sólo parte de los documentos expuestos por WIKILEAKS, cuyo dirigente, Assange, sigue aún, como Ana Frank, encerrado en la buhardilla de la embajada de Ecuador en Londres esperando a que los nazis que lo cercan lo dejen salir.  Pero ésto  nunca pasará. Tendran que montar un plan de escape lo más pronto posible porque éste prolongado encierro tiene que estar afectando el cortex cerebral de don Julian.