UNO, DOS, TRES, CUATRO, CINCO, SEIS, SIETE, OCHO, NUEVE, DIEZ...

UNO, DOS, TRES, CUATRO, CINCO, SEIS, SIETE, OCHO, NUEVE, DIEZ...
"EL CAPITALISMO NO ES NADA MÁS QUE UNA EMPRESA DE LADRONES COMUNES DISFRAZADA DE 'CIVILIZACION' QUE EXTENDIÓ, IMPERIALÍSTICAMENTE, A ESCALA GLOBAL, UN 'SISTEMA' (ECONÓMICO, POLÍTICO, IDEOLÓGICO Y SOCIAL) PARA LEGALIZAR Y LEGITIMAR CON LEYES UN ROBO MASIVO Y PLANETARIO DEL TRABAJO SOCIAL Y DE LOS RECURSOS NATURALES, ENMASCARADO DE 'ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL' ". Manuel Freytas



"UN SISTEMA ECONÓMICO CRUEL


AL QUE PRONTO HABRÁ

QUE CORTARLE EL CUELLO"

¡ QUÉ GRAN VERDAD !
PORQUE FUÉ ESE MISMO
SISTEMA ECONÓMICO CRUEL,
PRECISAMENTE,
¡ EL QUE LE CORTÓ EL CUELLO A ÉL !


Tuesday, April 21, 2015

THE "HIGH VALUE TARGETING" (HVT) PROGRAMAS DE ASESINATOS DE LA CIA (WIKILEAKS)


Una de las empíricas característas mas impresionantes que nos han traído los documentos sacados a la luz por WIKILEAKS es la omnipresencia de estos masacradores de esperanzas.

Estan en todas partes apagando cualquier luz que pueda asomar en el horizonte de los pueblos. 

Es altamente significativa, para entender éste momento histórico, ésta sin limites ubicuidad  con acceso directo a neutralizar --con el crimen-- a cualquier grupo militante que atente contra los intereses imperiales.

Ni que decir tiene que trabajan-en-equipo con los gobiernos locales que no son gobiernos de los pueblos que representan sino que pertenecen al Club Internacional de Clases Sociales en el Poder (CICSP) que, amalgamadas en un  solo  Gobierno Global (GG), es el  Gobierno de facto de la dictadura capitalista a escala mundial.  Las llamadas soberanías nacionales son tan solo las tramoyas tras la que se esconde ese GG,  dentro del cual, la omnipresencia de los escuadrones de la muerte del imperio (CIA),  es el  Alma Mater de todo  el asunto.
Veamos como trabaja ésta Alma Mater:

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

This is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impact on insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is for
internal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on these
groups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgent
groups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel,
Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, which
is "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obama
administration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States very
significantly increased its CIA assassination program at the expense of capture operations.


It produces a chart for US officials to use in strategically assessing future operations and methods in HVT assassinations.
 
Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel,
Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS, FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassination
Restraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals)
Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-Value
Date:
July 07, 2009

Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society Group
Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-hvt-counterinsurgency
.
               
                ....................................


High-Value Targeting Defined (C//NF)
We define high-value targeting as focused
operations against specific individuals or networks whose removal or marginalization should disproportionately degrade an insurgent group’s effectiveness.

The criteria for designating highvalue
targets will vary according to factors such as
the insurgent group’s capabilities, structure, and
leadership dynamics and the government’s desired
outcome. (C//NF)

Our study of successful and unsuccessful uses of HVT programs in counterinsurgencies identified several best practices that can be apply when planning or evaluating HVT operations:
 
Identifying Desired Outcome.
Because HVT operations can have unforeseen effects, governments tend to be most successful when they areclear about the desired impact on the insurgent group’s trajectory.

Basing Decisions on Knowledge of an Insurgent Group’s Internal Workings.
Governments’ successful use of HVT operations generally draw on a deep understanding of the targeted group’s internal workings and specific vulnerabilities, which is usually gained by penetrating the group or debriefing defectors.
 
Integrating HVT Operations With Other Elements of
Counterinsurgency Strategy.
Governments with effective HVT programs have integrated them into comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies, the other elements of which could be adjusted to capitalize on or compensate for the effects produced by HVT operations.
Protecting Potential Moderates.
Directing HVT operations against the most violent and extremist leaders may increase the likelihood of an eventual political settlement. Many insurgencies have internal divisions between the more militant leaders and those more politically oriented.
Capitalizing on Leadership Divisions.
Exacerbating or exploiting
leadership fissures, for example by co-opting disaffected insurgent leaders, can be as effective as targeting a group’s leadership through military action. (C//NF)
                  


Eroding Insurgent Effectiviness
HVT operations can cause greater disruption than a group can absorb when strikes outpace a group’s ability to replace its leaders or when the strikes result in the loss of individuals with critical skills such as
finance and logistics—who comprise a finite
quantity in any insurgency, according to our
review. HVT operations typically force remaining
leaders to increase their security discipline, which
may compromise a leader’s effectiveness.
In Colombia, successful HVT strikes against
top insurgent leaders in early 2008, in
conjunction with earlier strikes against secondand
third-tier leaders and finance and logistics
specialists, substantially eroded the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s
(FARC) capabilities, according to clandestine, Colombian National Police, and US Embassy in
Bogota reporting.1 2 3
 
 In Iraq, Jaysh Muhammad (JM) suffered a
significant setback in 2004 after British
forces captured the head of JM and his
replacements in short succession, according to
the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate.5
• Usama bin Ladin’s measures to avoid
detection, including his reliance on lowtechnology
communications, his reluctance to
meet with subordinates, and his contentment
with leading from a sequestered distance via
infrequent contact, have affected his ability to
command his organization, according to detainee
reporting.6 7 8 9 10 11 (S//NF)
Weakening Insurgent Will.
Leadership losses can  erode morale at all levels of the insurgency and reinforce the costs and risks of involvement, especially when no clear succession plan is in place.

Colombia.  The March 2008 death of FARC Secretariat member Raul Reyes is likely to have seriously damaged FARC discipline and morale, even among its leadership, according to a CIA field commentary.12.  Within a week of Reyes’ death,
Secretariat member Ivan Rios was killed by a
bodyguard, and in May 2008 a veteran FARC
commander and ideologue surrendered.13
 
Rank-and-file morale also suffered when
HAMAS failed in 2004 to announce the name of
its new leader following the deaths of Sheikh
Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, according to
an academic terrorism expert.14 (S//NF)
Changing the Level of Insurgent Support.
The death or capture of key insurgents may lead to
reduced domestic or foreign support for the group,
as supporters recalculate the insurgent group’s
chances of winning the conflict and consider the
potential costs of backing the losing side. Such a
phenomenon is enhanced when leadership strikes
coincide with other counterinsurgency successes.
 
• Malaysia’s arrest in 1998 of four top leaders of
the southern Thai separatist insurgent group
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO),
in concert with civil-military programs and an
expanded amnesty, led to substantial increases in
separatist defections and a decline in domestic
support for the group, according to reporting
from the US Embassy in Bangkok.15 16 17 (C//NF)
 
HVT strikes, however, may increase support for
the insurgents, particularly if these strikes enhance
insurgent leaders’ lore, if noncombatants are killed
in the attacks, if legitimate or semilegitimate
politicians aligned with the insurgents are targeted,
or if the government is already seen as overly
repressive or violent. Because of the psychological
nature of insurgency, either side’s actions are
less important than how events are perceived by
key audiences inside and outside the country,
according to an academic expert on
counterinsurgency.18
 
Israeli HVT efforts from 2000 to 2002
strengthened solidarity between terrorist groups
and bolstered popular support for hardline
militant leaders, according to US Embassy
officials in Jerusalem and clandestine
reporting.19 20 21 22 23 (S//NF)


:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
 
Esto es tan sólo parte de los documentos expuestos por WIKILEAKS, cuyo dirigente, Assange, sigue aún, como Ana Frank, encerrado en la buhardilla de la embajada de Ecuador en Londres esperando a que los nazis que lo cercan lo dejen salir.  Pero ésto  nunca pasará. Tendran que montar un plan de escape lo más pronto posible porque éste prolongado encierro tiene que estar afectando el cortex cerebral de don Julian.

No comments:

Blog Archive